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S'l'ATE:\IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellants, members of the 36th Utah State 
Legislature and citizens of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, appeal from a judgment of the District Court 
rif the Third .Judicial District, Honorable A. H. 
Ellett, .T udge, ruling that House Bill No. 81, enacted 
~r the 3f>th Utah State Legislature, providing for an 
mcrease in the income tax effective for the taxable 
year beginning .January 1, 1965, is constitutional. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
The appellants filed a complaint, challenging the 
constitutionality of House Bill No. 81, enacted bv th, 1 
Utah State Legislature. Thereafter, an amended an~ 
second amended complaints were filed and the respond-
ents filed an answer. On June 4, 1965, the trial court 
entered its amended judgment of dismissal, finding that 
House Bill No. 81, enacted by the 36th Utah State 
Legislature, became effective .May 11, 1965, and was 
not unconstitutional. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents submit that the decision of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
STATE~1ENT OF FACTS 
The 36th Utah State Legislature enacted Houst 
Bill No. 81 ( R. IO). This bill amended Sections 59-lH ' 
59-14-47, 59-14-67 and 59-14-70, Utah Code Annotated. 
1953. The appellants challenge the constitutionalityof 
the act insofar as it purports to raise the indiridual 1 
income tax and impose the increased rates effectiw i 
during the taxable year beginning January l, 1965 
Section 5 of House Bill No. 81 (Laws of Ctah, 1965. ' 
Chapter 125, Section 5} provides: 
"The tax rates provided for herein shall appl)· 
to all returns filed on or after January 1, 196ti 
for taxable rears commencing on or after Janu· 1 
ary 1, 1965." 
2 
Although the pleadings of the parties do not dis-
cJo~e b\· 1Yhat margin of votes I-louse Bill No. 81 was 
enacted, tbe House Journal of the 36th Legislature 
,Jisdose;; that the bill passed by a vote of 40 yeas to 
2.J. nays. with ti\·e members of the House of Represen-
tntin·s l•eing abseut. In the Senate, the bill passed by 
Fi ye:1s awl 12 nays. The act had no special provision 
iE'OYiding that it become effective at any other time 
thau .\Jay 11, 1965, although it did provide, as noted 
ah<ffe. for an increD.se in income taxes to be applied. 
for the taxable year beginning January 1, 1965. 
The appellants seek a determination that smce 
Article ,-I. Sedirm 2.5, of the Constitution of the State 
nt' I'tali provides that "[a]ll acts shall be officially 
p11blisht-d_, and no act shall take effect until so pub-
lished. uor until sixty days after the adjournment of 
+he session at "-hich it passed, unless the Legislature 
'•:· n 1·ott of two-thirds of all the members elected to 
e:1d1 lio1Jse. shall otherwise direct'', the tax rate could 
prir ·~rmstit11tio11al1y apply for the taxable year begin-
11111g Janiwry 1, 1965, or, at least, should not apply 
pnn~ tn \fay 11, 1965, the effective date of the act, 
heeause of the failure of the bill to be passed by a vote 
of two-thirds of the members of each house. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
DRTERl\IIXING THAT HOUSE BILL NO. 81. 
3 
AS ENACTED BY THE 36TH UTAH STATE 
LEGISLATURE, 'VAS CONSTITUTIONAL 
OR, AS RESPECTS ITS APPLICATION TO 
1 
THE INCOME TAX PAYABLE UNDER THE 
ACT, THAT IT APPLIES TO THE TAXABLE 
YEARS BEGINNING JANUARY 1, 1965. 
The appellants contend that House Bill No. 81, 
enacted by the 36th Utah State Legislature, on March 
11, 1965, does not conform to the requirements of 
Article VI, Section 25, of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah, which requires: 
"All acts shall be officially published, and no 1 
act shall take effect until so published, nor until 
sixty days after the adjournment of the sessiou , 
at which it passed, unless the Legislature by a 
vote of two-thirds of all the members eleded tr: 
each house, shall otherwise direct." 
House Bill No. 81 provides that the increased rates 
provided for therein "shall apply to all returns on or 
after January 1, 1966 for taxable years commencing 
on or after January 1, 1965." The act does not provide 
1 
for any special effective date. 
The tax increase resulting from the act applies to 
income earned during the taxable year commencing 
January 1, 1965 before, up to and subsequent to the 
passage of the act. It is because of this retroactive in· 
clusion of income under the increased tax rates that 
appellants claim that the bill, which did not become 
effective until sixty days after the adjournment of th~ 
4 
Le:.;i,Juture, ;s unconstitutional. Further, the appellants 
coi;tewl that House Bill No. 81 was not intended to 
8 ppl~ to ineome earned prior to the effective date of 
tlie bill, or }lay 11, 1965. 
It should be noted that the bill does not require 
returns filed in 1965 to be subject to the increased rates 
hut only returns filed on or after January 1, 1966, which 
is after the effective date of the bill. Thus, the effective 
date t'f the act is not changed beyond the sixty-day 
period proYided in the Constitution, but the operative 
etlect ut the ad proYides for retrospectiYe application. 
It is ;mportant to note that the tax on income earned 
in HHi.5 is not due and payable until the due date of 
tlie 1 !)fi.5 tax return on April 25, 1966. (Section 59-
H- 19. Utnh Code Annotated, 1953.) 
It is not in dispute that House Bill No. 81 failed 
t(, obtam the two-thirds necessary to impose an effective 
,J;1te nther tlrnn that of sixty days after the adjournment 
ili' ~he 1%5 Legislature. However, it is the respondents' 
position that the act does not provide for any other 
eifediYe date and that appellants confuse the question 
of the effecfo·e date of the act with the scope or opera-
tion of the act. Respondents submit that House Bill 
Xo. 81 did in fact become effective of .Mav 11, 1965. 
To rule otherwise would render the statute unconsti-
tional and the appellants' contention that the bill became 
effective at some other period is neither legally nor 
factually sound. In Blackrock Copper J.llining and 
Milling Co. v. Tin,qey, 34 Utah 369, 98 Pac. 180 ( 1908), 
thi5 Court stated: 
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" * * * ['VJ . h . e agam repeat, w at this court l . 
so often declared, that, when an act or statute1~: 
attacked upon the ground that it violates 801 : 
provision of the Constitution or in some wa/ 
repugnant to the instrument, it must clearh."an'. 
pear to be so, or the act or statute must be. hel1 
valid. This doctrine applies with especial fore~ 
to a law which sets in motion a sovereian power 
such as the power of taxation when it fs alleaed 
that the Constitution prohibits the exerciseb of 
the power. In such a case, unless it is made to 
appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the sove· 
reign power to impose taxes in a particular war 
is withheld from the Legislature, the law irnpo;. 
ing a particular tax must be upheld." 
In accord 'vith this view are the cases of Pleasant Grore 
City v. Holman, 59 Utah 242, 202 Pac. 1096; Jackson 
v. Bowneville Irr. District, 66 Utah 404, 243 Pac. 107: 
Howe v. Tax Commission, 10 U.2d 362, 353 P.2d 568. 
Such a ruling is only in keeping with the established 
proposition that every presumption must be indulged 
in favor of constitutionality. Thomas v. Daughtus of 
Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477. 
In view of the well established principle of statu· 
tory and constitutional construction indicated above, il 
is apparent that House Bill No. 81 had an effectire 
date of May 11, 1965. It is, of course, reasonable for 
House Bill No. 81 to have an effective date of Ma:1• 
11, 1965, and still cause all persons covered by the ac: 
to include in their 1966 income tax returns, at the in· 
creased rates, the taxable income earned during the year 
1965. This is merely another way of noting the di~· 
6 
tinction between retroactive operation of a statute and 
retroactive effective date. 
Although many states have adopted express con-
stitutional provisions against retroactive laws 1, Utah 
has no such constitutional provision. In the absence of 
such a constitutional provision, the general rule is that 
retroactive laws are not prohibited. Cohen v. Beneficial 
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541. The clear mean-
ing of Article VI, Section 25, of the Constitution of 
the State of "Ctah, makes it apparent that it was adopted 
only to govern the effective date of acts of the Legis-
lature and not to prohibit retroactive laws. Thus, in 
Garr"tt Frei,ght Lines v. Tax Commission, 103 Utah 
390, 13.5 P .2d 523 ( 1943), this court observed: 
"Neither the Federal Constitution nor the Utah 
Constitution has any provision in terms prohibit-
mg retroactive legislation-excepting that which 
forbids the enactment of ex post facto laws." 
It is apparent from the Garrett Freight Lines case that 
the appellants' argument, relating to the provisions of 
Article VI, Section 25, is not applicable. It may be 
argued that the Garrett Freight Lines case did not in-
volve a situation where the Legislature had passed a 
law for retrospective operation without two-thirds vote, 
but it is apparent that the court felt that Article VI, 
Section 25, did not inhibit an act being passed, effective 
sixty days after the adjournment of the Legislature, 
t· Colora~o Constitution, Article II, Section 11; Idaho Constitu-
siont" Article IX, Section 12; Montana Constitution, Article XV, ec ion 15. 
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which had retrospectiYe application, even though two. 
thirds of the Legislature did not concur therein. Thei· 
can be no doubt as to the right of the Legislature to iia. 
£'Si 
statutes which reach back, change, or modify the effect 01 
prior transactions, providing there is no constitutionai 
provision against retrospectiw law. Cooley, Constitu. 
tional Limitation.s·, 8th Ed. ( 1937), page 772. If no spe· 
cific constitutional prohibition to retrospectiYe laws exist. 
the Legislature may enact prospective laws which hare 
retroactive application. No constitutional objection 
exists in Utah, and, hence, no prohibition exists prerent-
ing House Bill No. 81 from having retrospective appli· 
cation. Garrett Freight Lines v. Ta.r Commission, supra. 
It is well established that a statute may haYe both 
an effective date and an operative date. Generally. the 
operative date is prospective but may, on occasion. be 
retrospective. County of Los Anqeles v. LamlJ, tH Cal 
196; TVilliams v. City of Vallejo, 36 Cal. App. 133, 
171 Pac. 834; Callahan v. City and CounflJ of Su:1 
Francisco, 68 Cal.App.2d 286, 156 P.2d 4nl; Was/1· 
ington Oil Co. v. State, 159 S.,V.2d 57 (Texas). Gen· 
erally, the effective date of legislation is that date fixed 
by the Constitution, and, in the absence of a legislatire 
intention to establish some other date, no other date 
beyond the constitutional provision is effective. Port-
land-Pendleton Tran~portation Co. ·v. Devin, 26 Wash. 
2d 333, 173 P.2d 994. In the instant case, it is apparent 
that the Legislature intended no other effective date than 
that provided by the Utah Constitution. 
It is ·well established that a tax or revenue bill cai 
8 
take effect prospectively but thereafter cause retroactive 
tax liability to those effected by the passage of the act. 
This was the situation before this Court in Garrett 
Freight Lines v. Tax Commission, supra. In that case, 
in 1841, the Utah Legislature enacted an excise tax 
of iour cents per gallon on the use of diesel in the State 
of Utah. The act was passed by the Legislature on 
February 13, 1941, and, without question, became effec-
tive May 13, 1941. It purported to impose the tax on 
the use of the fuel in the State on or after January I, 
1941. The taxpayer asserted that the part of the act 
which purported to impose a tax upon the use of fuel 
prior to the effective of the act was invalid. Al-
though the argument was based upon one of due pro-
cess, it appears that the Court carefully considered 
all the constitutional objections raised by the taxpayer 
and, in discussing retrospective legislation, stated: 
" 'If the Constitution does not expressly forbid 
retrospective legislation, the Legislature may 
impose a business tax up~n business done prior 
to the time the statute was adopted.' 2 Cooley, 
Taxation, 4th Ed., Sec. 522. 
" 'In apportioning the tax between the indi-
viduals, there is no valid objection to making it 
on consideration of a state of things that may 
now have come to an end; as where a tax is im-
posed on the extent of one's business for the pre-
ceding year instead of upon an estimate of the 
business for the year to come.' lb. Sec. 523, cit-
ing People v. Gold Co., 92 N.Y. 383; Drexel 
v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. 31. 
* * * 
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"Appellant .concedes that i1~co~ne taxes ma 
be ~ased t.1pon mcome earned w1thm a reason;il,
1
: 
p;r.10~ prior to the enadmeu~ ?f the taxing ;\lr 
l lus is "·ell established b~· dec1s1ons of the Fnitrd 
States Supreme Court and many state courk 
\Vhile the specific questioll raised by the appellant, 
was not directly passed upon by this Court, the fatt 
remains that a revenue bill, passecl by the Ctah State 
Legislature with an effective date of l\fay 13, Hlti±. '\a, 
held to legally impose a tax retroactively from its cffte· 
tive date to January l, 19.J<l. Further, the Court ex-
pressly noted no constitutional objection, either State 
or Federal, prohibited such action. The legislation i!l 
the instant case is no different from the statute in ti 1: 
Garrett case insofar as its effective and operafre d:1lr 
features are concerned. 
In the case of 1¥elch v. HcnriJ, 305 U.S. I.'34, the 
United States Supreme Court was presented "·ith an 
analogous situation. A 1933 lVisconsin statute impo,ed 
a tax upon net income in graduated rates. The taxpar 
er's 19:33 income tax return and the tax for that year 
were due and filed l\J arch 15, 193.J<. In 1935, the Wiscon· 
sin Legislature increased tax liabilities for the year~ 
1933 and 1934 by means of an act effective .Jlarch 2i. 
1935. The United States Supreme Court rejected a 
challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, stating: 
" * * * For more than seventv-five vears it ha.i 
been the familiar legislative prdctice ~f Congre~i 
in the enactment of revenue laws to tax retro· 
actively income or profits receiYed during th: 
year of the session in which the taxing statute Li 
10 
enacted, and in some instances during the year 
of the preceding session." 
Admittedly, this case did not deal with the same con-
stitutional provision invoked by the appellants. How-
eYer, it is apparent from this decision that the question 
of operation of a statute may be entirely different from 
the question of the effective date of the enactment. 
In United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498, the 
lJnited States Supreme Court observed that it was a 
uniform practice "to make" tax statutes "retroactive 
for relatively short periods so as to include profits from 
transactions consummated while the statute was in the 
process of enactment, or within so much of the calendar 
year as preceded the enactment." In almost every 
Instance where this has been done by the state or Federal 
legislatures, courts interpreting such statutes have stated 
them to be effective at a date certain but held them 
to include income earned prior to their enactment. 
Clearly, this demonstrates the simple proposition, ap-
parently not grasped by the appellants, that a statute 
may have an effective date at one time but be sufficiently 
broad in scope and operation to relate to previous pe-
riods.No case has been cited by the appellants, nor have 
the respondents been able to find a case, holding that 
a statute, which is retroactive in application or retro-
spective in its definition of taxable income, was uncon-
stitutional for the reasons which appellants attack the 
instant statute. The terms "retroactive" and "retro-
spective" are synonymous, and when applied to a statute 
denote a law which operates on matters which occurred 
11 
before it came into effect or which looks or acts bad:-
ward from its effectiYe date. Graham Paper Co. r. 
Gelmen, 232 l\Io. 155, 59 S. 'V.2d 4<9; Los A nr;eles Rund 
and Securities Co. v. Heath, 120 Cal. App. 128. 7 P.2d 
1089. 
A case very similar to the proposition presented iP 
the instant case is Leon 'l'. Torruella, 99 F.2d 8.5 (1st 
Cir. Puerto Rico). This case inn>lved the Organic Act 
of Puerto Rico which proYided that no act of the Leg11• 
lature should take effect until ninety days after its 
passing unless otherwise directed by a two-thirds Yote 
of the Legislature. A statute, making separation of 
spouses for seven years a grounds for divorce, was 
appro-\·ed by the Puerto Rico Legislature .}fay 9, 1933, 
to take effect ninety days after its apprnrnl. In 19.36. 
plaintiff sued for divorce under the statute :rnd his 1ri!e 
contested the action, alleging noncompliance with the 
statute and that the statute was contrary to the Organic 
Act of Puerto Rico. She claimed that the retroactire 
application of the divorce statute, sought by plaiDtitf. 
would render it unconstitutional in violation of the 
Organic Act provision. The First Circuit, in rejecti11g 
the argument, stated: 
"'Ve fa.ii to see wherein Act No . .J.6 in its 
enactment fails in any respect to comply \\'ith 
provisions of * * * the Organic Act. It was.ap; 
proved l\Iay 9th, 1933, a11d expressly pror1<leu 
that it should not take effect until ninety days 
after its approval, and fully compli~l~ with ihe 
[Organic Act prm·isions). This prov1s1on of t!;e 
Or!"anic Act has only to do with of a law not Hi ,., . 
application." 
12 
Applying this case to the facts in the instant case, it 
is apparent that House Bill No. 81 became effective on 
Mav 11, 1965, pursuant to Article VI, Section 25, of 
the. Utah Constitution. The appellants ask the Court 
to disregard this date. It is obvious that this cannot be 
llone. In doing so, appellants confuse and seek to 
obliterate the difference between an effective date of the 
bill and the prospective or retroactive application there-
of. 
The appellants' contention that the bill by its terms 
would not apply to income earned prior to May 11, 
1965, simply does not follow. The bill expressly states 
that it is applicable to tax returns filed after January 
1, 1966, for taxable years commencing on or after J anu-
:.try l, 1965. By the clear meaning of the statute, if the 
taxpayers' taxable year begins anytime after January 
L 1965, and prior to .May 11, 1965, his return on per-
sonal income must include any income earned during 
that period of time, which income is subject to taxation 
at the higher rates. Any other construction would be 
clearly contrary to the legislative intent and the clear 
meaning of the statute. The appellants' arguments to 
the contrary are at best specious. 
It is submitted that there is no basis for relief on 
the theories claimed by the appellants . 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that the appellants seek to strain the 
meaning of Article VI, Section 25, of the Constitution 
13 
of the State of Utah. Their argument fails to compre-
hend the difference between an effective date of an act, 
because of its substance, may have retrospectiYe opera 
ti on. 
It is submitted that the determination of the h;a] 
court, upholding the constitutionality of House Bill 
No. 81 and determining that it applies to all income 
earned subsequent to January 1, 1965, was correct. Tbi1 
Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents 
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